Henne, P., Niemi, L., Pinillos, Á., De Brigard, F., & Knobe, J. (2019). A Counterfactual Explanation for the Action Effect. Cognition, 190, 157-164. PREPRINT PDF

Semler, J. & Henne, P. (2019). Recent Experimental Work on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. PREPRINT

Henne, P., Bello, P., Khemlani, S., & De Brigard, F. (2019). Norms and the meaning of omissive enabling conditions. In A. Goel, C. Seifert, & C. Freksa (Eds.), Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Montreal, Canada: Cognitive Science Society. PREPRINT PDF

Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Yang, B. W., & De Brigard, F. (2019). Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization. Political Behavior. PDF

Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2018). Remembering Moral and Immoral Actions in Constructing the Self. Memory and Cognition. PDF

Henne, P., Semler, J., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018). Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture. Philosophia, 1-9. PDF

Henne, P., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2018). Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality? Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. OUP. Book

Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won't Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. PDF

Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146(6), 884. PDF

Henne, P., Pinillos, Á., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(2), 270-283. PDF

Henne, P., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2016). An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. Analysis, 76(3), 283-290.PDF

Chituc, V., Henne, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2016). Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”. Cognition, 150, 20-25. PDF