Published Work

Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won't Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of experimental psychology. General.

Stanley, M. L., Henne, P., Iyengar, V., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2017). I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General146(6), 884.

Henne, P., Pinillos, Á., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Cause by omission and norm: Not watering plants. Australasian Journal of Philosophy95(2), 270-283.

Henne, P., Chituc, V., De Brigard, F., & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2016). An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’Implies ‘Can’. Analysis76(3), 283-290.

Chituc, V., Henne, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & De Brigard, F. (2016). Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”. Cognition150, 20-25.

 

Public Articles

Chituc & Henne. (2016). The New York Times.

 

Forthcoming

Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality? (with Sinnott-Armstrong)

 

In Preparation and Under Review

Nothin' From Nothin' Leaves Nothin'

What's Causal Selection?

Omissive Causes and Omissive Enablers (with Khemlani, Bello, and De Brigard)

Counterfactuals, Similarity, and Possibility (with Stanley and De Brigard)

Justice may be Impossible, but Institutions Must be Feasible (with Ancell)

Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture: Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ (with Semler, Chituc, De Brigard, and Sinnott-Armstrong)

Willing to Be Little (with Stanley, Iyengar, Sinnott-Armstrong, De Brigard)

Denorming Omissive Causation (with Stanley and De Brigard)

To view preprints and drafts, visit my Academia page or my Research Gate page. Google Scholar.